Comparative Water Law and Management: The Yellow River Basin In Western China and the State of Kansas In the Western United States by Griggs, Burke W. et al.
@BCL@A8059DC2.DOC   (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/2009 7:50 AM
428
COMPARATIVE WATER LAW AND MANAGEMENT:  THE 
YELLOW RIVER BASIN IN WESTERN CHINA AND THE STATE OF 
KANSAS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES
Burke W. Griggs
Counsel, Division of Water Resources
Kansas Department of Agriculture
John C. Peck
Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law
Special Counsel, Foulston Siefkin, LLP
Xue Yunpeng
Deputy Division Chief / Senior Engineer
Department of Water Resources Management and Regulation 
Yellow River Conservancy Commission
Editor’s Note: The authors participated in a program in November and 
December 2006 jointly sponsored by the University of Kansas’s School of Law 
and Office of International Programs, and the International Water Management 
Institute, headquartered in Sri Lanka, under which six Asian water 
management experts visited KU and Kansas to exchange ideas on water law 
and management.  The experts came from China, India, Bangladesh, and 
Nepal.  Professor Peck directed the program, Mr. Griggs acted as program 
coordinator, and Mr. Xue was the Chinese participant.  Professor Peck and Mr. 
Griggs described the program in detail in their article “Groundwater Law and 
Management: The Asia (IWMI)-Kansas Program,” 41 Creighton Law Review, 
315-368 (April 2008).  The Creighton article also described aspects of 
groundwater law and management in South Asia: India, Bangladesh, and 
Nepal.  The present article focuses on China, the Yellow River Basin in 
particular, and Kansas. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Given the dramatic differences between the Yellow River Basin of China 
(“the Basin”) and the river basins and aquifers of Kansas, and given the 
equally dramatic differences in the political histories and legal cultures that 
produced their respective water laws and water policies, a comparison between 
these laws and policies may appear quixotic or odd.  Yet during the last three 
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decades, these two disparate places have come to share several important 
characteristics regarding water management. 
Water allocation is a serious problem faced by both western China and the 
western United States, including Kansas.  These regions share similar geo-
hydrological conditions and economic characteristics, such as large-scale 
irrigated agriculture in arid and semi-arid regions, large wheat and corn 
production, the drying up of rivers, groundwater over-exploitation, water rights 
transfers from irrigation to industrial and municipal uses, and growth in their 
dairy and meat industries.  However, the Chinese and western American 
approaches to water allocation are markedly different. Most importantly for
this article, their respective laws differ fundamentally.  The water law of 
Kansas and other western states is grounded upon the principle that water 
rights are private property rights, while China’s water law does not recognize 
water rights as private property rights, and is instead grounded on 
governmental management at various levels. Part I of this Article provides a 
brief historical summary, to show how the Basin and Kansas have come to 
share a series of water realities.  Part II of this Article surveys the most 
important water-supply problems in the Basin and in Kansas.  Part III surveys 
their respective water laws and water management and allocation programs, 
with particular attention to water rights transfers, to show how the Chinese and 
Kansas systems have sought to address these problems.  
II. THE MODERN CONVERGENCE OF THE YELLOW RIVER BASIN AND    
KANSAS
China is ancient, and so are its waterworks.  According to legend, many 
of the rivers of northern China were diverted by the great engineer-emperor 
Yu, who dredged and ruled between 2205 and 2198 B.C. as one of the Three 
Sages of the Hsia Dynasty, the first in Chinese history.1  Large flood control 
works and irrigation projects in China date from the seventh century B.C.; 
many of these diversions, such as that of the Min River in Sichuan Province, 
continue to operate.2  The largest span of Chinese history—viewed crudely as 
the two millennia between the unification of China under the Ch’in in 221 B.C 
and the fall of the last Ch’ing emperor in 1911—provides vast histories of 
water resource management, of regional and inter-regional water projects, and 
of water conflicts.3 Between 605 and 610 A.D., the emperor Sui-Yang-di 
supervised the construction of the 1747 km long Grand Canal, linking the 
1. CHARLES O. HUCKER, CHINA’S IMPERIAL PAST: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE 
HISTORY AND CULTURE 23 (1975).
2. See ALASDAIR CLAYRE, THE HEART OF THE DRAGON 136 (Collins/Harvill 1984); see 
also HUCKER, supra note 1, at 44 (describing the same irrigation system from the perspective of 
the Chengtu region).
3. See RANDALL A. DODGEN, CONTROLLING THE DRAGON: CONFUCIAN ENGINEERS AND 
THE YELLOW RIVER IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 1-3 (2001).  The Grand Canal still operates, 
connecting Beijing in the north with Hangzhou in the south, a distance of over 1,110 miles.  Id.
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Yangtze and Yellow Rivers through a series of canals and the natural 
waterways of east-central China, greatly strengthening the social and economic 
connections between north and south.4
From at least the sixth century A.D. onward, China maintained centralized 
control of large water projects, developed them as state enterprises, and 
managed them with its vast bureaucracy. Even the Mongols, detested by the 
Han Chinese as outsiders, rebuilt the Grand Canal and extended it to Beijing 
during the thirteenth century.5  The revolutionary states that succeeded late 
imperial China, first the Republic of China (1911-1949) and especially the 
People’s Republic of China (1949-present), did not change these essentials of 
water policy.6  Under Mao Zedong, China harnessed three cardinal creations of 
post-Enlightenment Europe—the nation-state, political ideology, and modern 
industry—to build and to realize water projects of enormous scale.  (For 
example, Mao irrigated nearly eight million hectares of land in three months, a 
project made possible through the labor of 100 million peasants.7)  Communist 
China, from the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution, consciously 
attempted a permanent, comprehensive, and revolutionary break with its 
dynastic past.
During the 1980’s, however, China began to evolve beyond communism, 
as it embraced the global market economy.  Unlike the Soviet Union, China 
retained the structure of its communist state, its central command of the 
national economy, its central bureaucracy, and its planning of titanic state 
water projects.  Chief among these is the Three Gorges Dam, which is filling a 
reservoir as long as Kansas is wide (400 miles), and which has already forced 
the relocation of over one million farmers.  China plans to add the equivalent 
of another Three Gorges Dam every two years by 2020.8  From the Great Wall 
to the Three Gorges Dam, China has steadfastly remained a vast and 
centralized state, with commensurate water infrastructure.  
Nonetheless, China’s entrance into the world economy has brought about 
important legal changes in its water law and policy, which run counter to its 
long traditions—at first feudal, and then communist—of subordinating law to 
the exercise of state power.9  This change has in turn established a new legal 
framework for water rights, the 1988 China Water Law and its 2002 revision.  
Early in the twenty-first century, China has accomplished a new legal 
framework for water rights and water management that seeks to promote 
efficient water management and articulate water rights without compromising 
the centralized administration of water rights and the state’s ownership and 
4. HUCKER, supra note 1, at 138. 
5. Id. at 286-87. 
6. Patricia Wouters et al., The New Development of Water Law in China, 7 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 243, 247 (2004) [hereinafter The New Development]; see generally LESTER ROSS 
& MITCHELL A. SILK, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
1-3 (1987) . 
7. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 547 (2d ed. 1999). 
8. Shai Oster, Three Gorges Dam Forces Another Move, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at A6.
9. The New Development, supra note 6, at 247.
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control of water resources.10  
By contrast, the histories of the Anglo-American legal tradition, and of 
water’s place within them, are largely histories of weakness, in which 
absolutism was effectively frustrated, private property rights were established 
early, and the exertions of centralized state power were long delayed.  The 
historical accidents of early modern Britain frustrated the development of 
absolutism in England: while France and Spain emerged from their wars of 
religion as absolute monarchies, England emerged from its wars of religion as 
a limited one.  Impoverished by wars, the late Tudors and the early Stuart 
monarchs came to depend upon Parliament for money, which in turn came to 
fear absolutist efforts to claim private property.11  Such fear largely produced 
the British civil wars of the 1640’s and the revolution of 1688-89, which was 
“Glorious” principally because of its opposition to “popery and arbitrary 
government”—specters that threatened the security of title to private 
property.12  Although the power of the English (and, after 1707, British) state 
grew tremendously during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it did not 
do so in an absolutist fashion.13
The rise of British imperial rule over this same period—first in Ireland, 
then in North America—led to further opposition to absolutism, especially in 
British colonies.  Indeed, the ideological opposition to absolutism that had 
played such a large role in the seventeenth-century English revolutions played 
a similar role during the American Revolution and the controversies over the 
Constitution.14  Largely as a result of that ideological opposition, the 
Constitution defined the limits of governmental power substantially by the 
private property rights it could not violate—seizing private property without 
compensation, or quartering troops in private homes, among other things.15
Such principles rest upon a belief that private property is a natural thing, so the 
right to private property is an inalienable right.16
Water rights are private property rights in the English legal tradition.17
American law continued this tradition, since Locke’s theory of property, so 
radical in the seventeenth century, had become orthodox by the turn of the 
10. For another review of the 1988 and 2002 China Water Law, see id. at 259-64, 273-99. 
11. DEREK HIRST, AUTHORITY AND CONFLICT: ENGLAND, 1603-1658, at 27, 112, 225 
(1986).
12. J.R. JONES, COUNTY AND COURT: ENGLAND, 1658-1714, at 234-55 (1978).
13. W.A. SPECK, RELUCTANT REVOLUTIONARIES: ENGLISHMEN AND THE REVOLUTION OF 
1688, at 241-51 (1988).
14. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1967); see, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 22 (U.S. 1776) (opposing 
“absolute Despotism” and the establishment of an “arbitrary Government”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
9, cl. 3 (prohibiting legislative absolutism in the form of Bills of Attainder).
15. U.S. CONST. amends. V, III.
16. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 294-97 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
17. See generally JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW
(2004) (summarizing Blackstone’s view that a water right is an individual property right and that 
private actions were available to defend the right).
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nineteenth century. According to Locke, apply industry to wilderness, and 
prove up property.18  By 1848, the United States had obtained legal title to the 
American West; yet to settle it, the United States relied upon grants of these 
millions of acres of land and acre-feet of water rights of previously public 
property to private entities and persons.  Such reliance on the private sector 
contrasts starkly with the history of land and water development in China.  
Rather than build railroads, it granted lands to railroad corporations.  Rather 
than finance the sale of virgin farm and range lands, it passed a series of 
homestead and range acts that allowed private persons to obtain legal title to 
real estate in exchange for their work. And in the realm of water rights, this 
method reached a logical extreme.  Rather than generating its own law on 
water rights, state courts and state legislatures instead recognized a local 
custom that was already in place—the “law of the camps,” prior 
appropriation.19
In the driest parts of the West, however, the climate and the soil began to 
falsify Locke’s theory of property.  West of central Kansas, farmers and 
ranchers needed more than 160 acres to survive, because lower precipitation 
produced unsustainably low yields. Private enterprises such as irrigation 
companies often lacked the capital and the leverage to build the necessary 
diversion works from distant sources.  In the drier parts of the West, industry 
alone could not transform wilderness into property.
In responding to this hydrological reality, the United States entered its 
imperial phase with water.20  From the Reclamation Act of 1902 forward, the 
federal government financed, built, and controlled the water projects that 
attempted the full development of the West and the exploitation of its natural 
resources.21  The Bureau of Reclamation either built or essentially subsidized 
the construction of irrigation projects such as the Bostwick Irrigation Districts 
of Nebraska and Kansas; of reservoir storage and hydropower projects such as 
the Grand Coulee and Boulder Dams on the Colorado River; of interstate water 
reservoirs such as Elephant Butte Reservoir in New Mexico (on the Rio 
Grande) and John Martin Reservoir in Colorado (on the Arkansas River); and 
of massive diversion works such as the Central Arizona Project.  The words 
embossed into Hoover Dam revealed this new, imperial, concrete presence: 
18. See LOCKE, supra note 16.  Locke’s theory of property was implicitly recognized in 
several nineteenth century common law cases.  See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1805); Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843). 
19. See, e.g., Morton v. Solambo Copper Mining Co., 26 Cal. 527 (1864); Irwin v. Phillips, 
5 Cal. 140 (1855); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).  See also STEPHEN J.
FIELD, PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF EARLY DAYS IN CALIFORNIA WITH OTHER SKETCHES 73 
(The Legal Classics Library 1989); JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL 
MOTION 13 (1987). 
20. For a sustained treatment of the imperial dimension to western water development, see
DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE 
AMERICAN WEST (Pantheon Books 1985). See also K.A. Wittfogel, Developmental Aspects of 
Hydraulic Societies, in IRRIGATION CIVILIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 43 (J.H. Steward, 
ed., Pan-American Union 1955).
21. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
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“Kaiser Permanente.” (Or, no less humbly, the Imperial Irrigation District of 
the Imperial Valley of California.)22
By 1960 or so, China and the American West seemed to have little in 
common, other than their dry hinterlands and their patriotism.  In the western 
United States, property rights in water predate systematic, large scale water 
development, while the reverse is true in China.  In China, empire and 
centralized rule preceded the establishment of property rights in water; in the 
American West, private water rights and state water law preceded massive 
federal water supply projects.  Their construction required a federalist 
compromise with long-established (at least in American terms) water rights 
and water-management regimes that were based in state, not federal, law.23  
Such a compromise has not been necessary in China. 
Nonetheless, from these fundamentally different origins, water 
management in both the Basin and the American West began to converge 
during the late twentieth century.  The first convergence regards water 
infrastructure and its politics: in both Communist China and Cold War 
America, national governments embarked upon massive water-control and 
water-supply projects, establishing an unprecedented national and federal 
presence in distant areas.24  Such large-scale water development assured these 
arid regions of much greater and more dependable water supplies, thus 
attracting unprecedented economic and demographic growth.  The second 
convergence regards water-diversion technology: the development of large-
scale groundwater irrigation during the 1960’s and 1970’s brought higher 
yields and new development, but created serious problems such as the 
impairment of surface water flows, land subsidence, and salinization.25  These 
two convergences led to the third and most important convergence: water 
shortage from overuse and overappropriation.  Reservoirs brought population 
and development, which increased pressures on water supplies, at the same 
time that increased groundwater pumping was depleting flows to those 
reservoirs, lowering their levels.  Across the world, water experts began to 
discern a common pattern of groundwater overuse and its consequences—the 
“rise and fall of groundwater socio-ecologies.”26
Whether the causes of these convergences are more similar than different 
is, as usual, a matter of scholarly debate.  This article begins with the 
presumption that these convergences provide an opportunity to examine how 
the different water management policies and water laws of the Basin and of 
Kansas have addressed, and can address, common problems.  The pressure of 
massive reservoirs can literally cause earthquakes, whether at Hoover Dam or 
22. See MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST & ITS DISAPPEARING 
WATER (1986) (providing a comprehensive and critical examination of the reclamation program).
23. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & 
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
24. See generally Wittfogel, supra note 20; WORSTER, supra note 20.
25. See generally Tushaar Shah, The Groundwater Economy of South Asia: An Assessment 
of Size, Significance, and Socio-Ecological Impacts, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 407 (2006).
26. Id. at 428.
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at Three Gorges.27  Impending groundwater crises may unfold more slowly, 
but their long-term effects may prove to be more dangerous. Against that 
challenge, comparing the successes and failures of water management in the 
Basin and in Kansas may lead to useful conclusions.
III. Common Water-Supply Problems in the Yellow River Basin and 
Kansas  
Western Kansas and the northwest part of the Basin share many geo-
hydrological conditions and economic characteristics.  Both pursue large-scale 
irrigated agriculture in arid and semi-arid regions, with an emphasis on wheat 
and corn production, as well as expanding dairy and meat industries.  
However, the over-exploitation of groundwater has led to dry-up problems, 
both on the Yellow River and on the Kansas portion of the upper Arkansas 
River. Both places have already undergone water rights transfers from 
irrigation to municipal and industrial use.  These types of transfers may 
become more prevalent as cities and industries, including coal-fired power 
plants, have increased water demand. 
A. The Yellow River Basin
1. In General
Besides persistent and serious flood and sediment problems, the Yellow 
River is one of the great rivers of the world facing extreme water stress and 
dry-up problems.28  These problems result from the vast increase in the area of 
irrigated land in the Basin, which has produced a large disparity between water 
demand and water supply. In the 1950’s, the irrigated area in the Basin was 
800,000 hectares (“ha”); by 2000, that figure had reached 7.53 million ha.  The 
Lower Reach of the Yellow River’s main stem ran dry at least part of the time 
during twenty-one of the twenty-seven years between 1972 to 1998, for a total 
of 1,050 days, or roughly fifty days a year. In the worst year, 1997, it was dry 
for 221 days, along more than 700 km of the main stem.29 The dry-up problem 
occurred earlier in the year and more frequently as well on the five large 
tributaries of the Yellow River—the Wei, Fen, Yiluo, Qin and Dawen Rivers.  
The Qin River first dried up in 1962, and has dried up almost every year since 
1965. In 1991, it dried up for 287 days.30
27. Gautam Naik & Shai Oster, Scientists Link China’s Dam to Earthquake, Renewing 
Debate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at A6. 
28. See, e.g., Geoffrey Lean, Death of the World’s Rivers, THE INDEP. (London), Mar. 12, 
2006, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/death-of-the-worlds-rivers-
469597.html.
29. Li Guoying, Thoughts and Considerations on Long-term Yellow River Development and 
Management, JOURNAL OF YELLOW RIVER (assessed in Dec. 2002) (P.R.C), available at
www.yellowriver.gov.cn.
30. An Xindai, Current Status of Management and Regulation of Yellow River Water 
Resources and Future Prospect, 13 J. CHINA WATER RES. 16-19 (2007) (P.R.C.).
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Groundwater overuse and salinity are also serious problems in the Basin.  
By 2000, long-term overuse had reduced groundwater supplies there by an 
estimated 1,120 million cubic meters, causing sixty-five cones of depression in 
the Basin, across an area of 6,000 square kilometers (km2).  The overdraft of 
groundwater is most serious in the Shanxi and Shaanxi provinces, which have 
suffered thirty-four and eighteen groundwater depression cones, respectively.31  
Overdrafting also causes land subsidence. From 1959 to 1989, 200 km2 in the 
area surrounding Xi’an, the capital city of Shaanxi Province, had subsided due 
to overdrafting by as much as 1.8 meters—nearly six feet. Similarly, over 250 
km2 surrounding Taiyuan, the capital city of Shanxi Province, has subsided by 
as much as 2.6 meters.32
Integrated management and regulation of surface and groundwater 
supplies in the Basin have prevented the dry-up of the River’s main stem since 
1999, but increasing conflicts between water demand and water supply, and 
their corresponding environmental issues, have not been resolved.33  This is 
true especially in the Nixia Hui National Autonomous Region (NXAR) and the 
Inner-Mongolia Autonomous Regions (IMAR), which are located in the 
northwest part of the Basin.  Excessive diversions from the Yellow River for 
irrigation, and the lack of both groundwater management and proper drainage 
systems, have caused serious salinity problems in as much as 46% of the land 
in the irrigation areas.34  Overexploitation of groundwater supplies has caused 
cones of depression in the cities of Yinchuan, Shizuishan, Baotou, and Hohot, 
and the distance to groundwater in these cities has deepened from an average 
of 12.7 m to 40 m.35  Due to the growth of inefficient irrigation in the large arid 
land area along the edge of the desert, and due to the rapid increase in urban 
and industrial groundwater withdrawals, both the NXAR and the IMAR have 
exceeded the water quotas allocated to them by the central government.  Even 
after 1999, these withdrawals have nearly run the River dry during the 
irrigation season.36  
In 2002 the Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC), for the first 
time, suspended the issuance of new water permits in the region, to force these 
regions to improve irrigation efficiency and to ensure streamflows.37  Inspired 
31. YELLOW RIVER CONSERVANCY COMM’N, THE YELLOW RIVER WATER RESOURCES 
AND MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION 51-52 (Yellow River Conservancy Press 2006) (P.R.C.) 
(on file with the author Xue Yunpeng) [hereinafter YRCC, YELLOW RIVER WATER RESOURCES].
32. LIN XUEYU ET AL., STUDY ON THE GROUNDWATER RESOURCES IN THE YELLOW RIVER 
BASIN AND ITS RENEWABLE CAPACITY 148-49 (Yellow River Conservancy Press 2006) (P.R.C.).
33. SU MAOLIN, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF THE UNIFIED WATER 
ALLOCATION AND REGULATION IN THE YELLOW RIVER, PROCEEDING OF THE 2ND 
INTERNATIONAL YELLOW RIVER FORUM 202-09 (Shang Hongqi ed., Yellow River Conservancy 
Press, vol. 4 2005) (P.R.C.).
34. Sun Xuetao, Some Issues on Water-saving and High-efficiency Farming of China, 4 J.
CHINA ENG’G SCI. 24, 24-30 (2002) (P.R.C.), available at http://scholar.ilib.cn/A-
zggckx200209005.html. 
35. XUEYU ET AL., supra note 32, at 148-49.
36. YRCC, YELLOW RIVER WATER RESOURCES, supra note 31, at 122-23.
37. YELLOW RIVER CONSERVANCY COMM’N, DESIGN AND PRACTICE IN WATER RIGHT 
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by the practice of water rights exchanges in the United States and Australia, 
the YRCC and the Basin’s provincial governments began to conduct water 
rights transfer experiments, to provide water supplies for the burgeoning coal-
based industry in the region.  Chinese water experts continue to investigate an 
integrated surface and groundwater management program, in an attempt to 
provide both sustainable water development and environmental protection.38  
2.  The Particular Problems of IMAR and NXAR
Located in the northwest area of the Yellow River Basin and surrounded 
by deserts and mountains, the irrigation districts of the IMAR and the NXAR 
rank as the second and third largest agricultural water consumers in the 
Basin.39  The average annual precipitation in these regions is low—180-400 
mm and 130-400 mm respectively, while the average annual evaporation is 
high—1,100-1,600 mm and 1,845-2,389 mm, respectively.40
Like the Lower Nile River in Egypt, irrigation is critical for agriculture in 
the Basin. Irrigation with Yellow River water started in these regions 2000 
years ago, and it expanded greatly in the 1960s, when the Qingtongxia and 
Sanshenggong Dams were constructed.  Due to low design standards and lack 
of funds for construction and maintenance, most of the irrigation canals are not 
lined, and the drainage systems are incomplete, with corresponding low 
efficiency in these two regions.41  After over thirty years’ operation without 
proper maintenance, the actual irrigation area has decreased to 435,400 ha in 
the NXAR and 762,400 ha in the IMAR, while the water use efficiency of 
these canal systems ranges between 0.38 to 0.45 and 0.35 to 0.51, 
respectively.42 In other words, between 50-60% of Yellow River water is lost 
TRANSFER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION 32-38 (Yellow River Conservancy Press 
2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter YRCC, DESIGN AND PRACTICE].
38. Xindai, supra note 30, at 16-19.
39. See YRCC, YELLOW RIVER WATER RESOURCES, supra note 31, at 116. The table of 
average yearly surface water consumption of different sectors of the Yellow River from 1988-
2008 shows agricultural water use accounts for 90.7% of the total surface water consumption of 
the Basin, while the agricultural water use in NXAR and IMAR accounts for over 97% of the 
total surface water use.  Id.  Shangdong Province in the Lower Reach and IMAR always rank first 
and second largest water users in both total consumption and agricultural sector, respectively.  Id.  
However, NXAR surpassed Henan Province in the Lower Reach and became the third largest 
water consumer in the case of total consumption after 1988 but always ranks third in the case of 
the agricultural sector.  Id.
40. See Fen Ping et al., The Hydrological Characteristics of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region, 21 J. HYDROLOGY CHINA 53, 53-55 (2001) (P.R.C.); Liu Helin et al., Impact of the 
Irrigation Water from the Yellow River on Salinification in Hetao Regions of Inner-Mongolia, 34
J. ANHUI AGRIC. SCI. CHINA 948, 948-50 (2006) (P.R.C.).
41. THE INST. OF RECONNAISSANCE, PLAN, DESIGN, & RESEARCH OF THE YELLOW RIVER 
CONSERVANCY COMM’N (IRPDR-YRCC), THE BIOGRAPHY OF THE HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING 
WORKS OF THE YELLOW RIVER 499-501, 561-67 (Henan People’s Press 1996) (P.R.C.).
42. THE HYDROLOGY BUREAU OF NINGXIA (HBNX), THE YELLOW RIVER WATER RIGHT 
TRANSFER MASTER PLAN OF THE NINGXIA AUTONOMOUS REGION (2005) (P.R.C.); INST. OF 
HYDRAULIC AND ELEC. RECONNAISSANCE & DESIGN OF INNER MONGOLIA AUTONOMOUS 
REGION (IHERD-IMAR), THE YELLOW RIVER WATER RIGHT TRANSFER MASTER PLAN OF THE 
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during the canal transfer process. 
Since 1998, the Chinese government has established a national program to 
rebuild and maintain large irrigation districts, sharing the costs with local 
governments.  In 1999, the governments of NXAR and the IMAR developed 
their Large Irrigation Districts Water Saving Plan of Year 2015, under the 
instruction of the central Ministry of Water Resources of China.  However, due 
to lack of funds, especially matching funds from the provincial and local 
governments, most of the planned projects have not been implemented.43  In 
the three large irrigation districts of the NXAR and the IMAR, actual 
investment in these projects is a scant 4-10% of the total plan fund.44
There are four major water problems in the Basin: (1) the continuous 
over-use of surface water, (2) underdevelopment of groundwater resources for 
irrigation, (3) irrigation-induced salinity, and (4) groundwater over-drafting in 
cities.
The first major water problem in the Basin is the continuous over-use of 
surface water from the Yellow River. Due to high demand for irrigation water, 
and the low efficiency of its irrigation systems, almost every year both the 
NXAR and the IMAR have diverted and consumed much more surface water 
from the Yellow River than their allocated yearly quotas allow.  Between 1999 
and 2005, the average water consumption diverted from the Yellow River in 
the NXAR and IMAR was 24% and 39% higher than their respective quotas.45
During the peak irrigation periods between May and early July, when the 
Yellow River’s flow exceeds 1,000 m3/s, canal diversions in the NXAR and 
IMAR capture 90% of that flow, leaving just 100 m3/s of streamflow in the 
downstream Inner Mongolia Reach. Sometimes that flow can fall below the 
minimum flow alarm threshold of 50 m3/s, nearly running the river dry over 
the 200 km stretch between the Upper Reach and the Middle Reach of the 
Yellow River, while also threatening dry-ups on the Middle Reach and Lower 
INNER MONGOLIA (2005) (P.R.C.).  Both Right Transfer Master Plans have been submitted by 
the governments of NXAR and the IMAR and ratified and approved by the YRCC.
43. Zhao Zhilian, The Matching Fund Problems of Irrigation Water Saving Projects of 
Yellow River Irrigation Districts in Northwest China, YELLOW RIV. NEWSPAPER, Oct. 12, 2007, 
available at http://www.hwcc.com.cn/newsdisplay/newsdisplay.asp?Id=181383.  An 
investigation of 255 large Irrigation Districts of China in 2005 showed that on average only 7% of 
the planned matching funds for key irrigation water saving projects owed by the provincial and 
local governments have actually been funded.  As to farmland level projects, the actual funded 
rate is 4%; the situation is even worse for the Yellow River Irrigation Districts in the northwest 
area of China.  Id.
44. See YRCC, DESIGN AND PRACTICE, supra note 38, at 178 (stating the plan for the water 
saving project fund for the three large irrigation districts is 14.384 billion RMB, but the actual 
fund invested is only 1.364 billion RMB).
45. See YELLOW RIVER CONSERVANCY COMM’N, YELLOW RIVER WATER RESOURCES 
BULLETIN: 1999-2005 (P.R.C.).  The average actual consumption of the Yellow River water in the 
NXAR from 1999 to 2005 was 3,819 million cubic meters, which was 728 million cubic meters 
or 24% higher than the average yearly water quota.  Id.  Similarly, the actual consumption of the 
Yellow River water in the IMAR from the Yellow River was 1,386 million cubic meters or 38.6% 
higher than its allocated quota.  Id.
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Reach.46
The second major water problem in the Basin is underdevelopment of 
groundwater resources in irrigation areas.  The sustainable yield of 
groundwater supplies in the NXAR and IMAR is estimated to be 1,695 and 
4,441 million cubic meters, respectively.47  However, according to the Yellow 
River Water Resources Bulletins from 1999 to 2005, the actual average annual 
groundwater consumption in these regions was only 288 and 1,896 million 
cubic meters per year between 1999 and 2005, which accounts for only 17% 
and 43% of their respective estimated renewable groundwater resources. 
The third major water problem in the Basin is irrigation-induced salinity. 
Since the irrigation systems in NXAR and IMAR consist mostly of unlined 
earthen canals with poor drainage systems,48 their inefficiencies have lost a 
high amount of water through seepage and evaporation, while greatly 
increasing the salinity of the irrigated soils.  For example, there are about 
133,000 ha of saline land in the Qingtongxia Irrigation District of the NXAR, 
and about 333,000 ha in the Hetao Irrigation District of the IMAR. In other 
words, between 40-62% of the total irrigated area of these two irrigation 
districts is officially classified as saline.49
The fourth major water problem in the Basin is groundwater overpumping 
in the regions’ large cities.  In contrast to the high water tables in rural irrigated 
areas, the water tables in large cities such as Yinchuan, Baotou, and Hohhot in 
the NXAR and the IMAR are dropping rapidly and continuously, due to the 
overpumping of confined groundwater for domestic and industrial use.50  In 
Yinchuan City, the capital of the NXAR, the area of groundwater cones of 
depression has increased from 262 km2 in 1995 to 470 km2 in 2003.  Similarly, 
the water table has been lowered by between 30 and 150 meters over the last 
thirty years.  Overpumping has also caused the previously confined aquifer to 
mix with the shallow water table, polluting the aquifer.51  
B.  Kansas
The state of Kansas lies on the boundary between the humid East and the 
semi-arid West.  Annual rainfall decreases from eastern to western Kansas 
from a high of 101 cm in the southeast to a low of 40 cm in the northwest.  In 
2002, the average farm size was 296.6 ha.  Approximately 14.7% of farmland 
46. YRCC, YELLOW RIVER WATER RESOURCES, supra note 31, at 122-23.
47. See Zhang Xuecheng & Pan Qimin, THE ASSESSMENT OF THE YELLOW RIVER WATER 
RESOURCES 131 (Yellow River Conservancy Publishing House 2006).
48. YRCC, DESIGN AND PRACTICE, supra note 37, at 121, 245 (clarifying only 16.3% of 
the total length of the canal system of Qingtongxia Irrigation District in NXAR is lined and only 
4.43% of the Hetao Irrigation District is lined).
49. Xuetao, supra note 34, at 24-30.
50. XUEYU ET AL., supra note 32, at 148-49.
51. Xue Saiguang & Fang Shuxing, The Water Resources Development and Environmental 
Problems in Nixia Irrigation Area, in PROCEEDING OF THE HIGH LEVEL SYMPOSIUM ON THE 
WATER RESOURCES PROBLEM OF NORTHWEST CHINA AND COUNTERMEASURES 328-335 (Jiao 
Yong, ed., Xinhua Press 2006).
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of the state is irrigated, while in the semi-arid west and southwest parts of 
Kansas, irrigated farmland accounts for 36.7% and 53.5% of farmland, 
respectively.  Almost all of the irrigation in these parts of Kansas is from 
groundwater, using the center pivot irrigation system.52  Kansas too has its 
problems with water, and most of them are related to groundwater overdraft: 
(1) the unsustainable development of groundwater supplies, which has caused 
a permanent lowering of the water table; (2) the decrease of baseflows and 
riparian vegetation; (3) the shrinkage of streamflows; and (4) salinity 
problems.
The first and most important problem in Kansas is the unsustainable 
development of groundwater, which has caused a permanent lowering of the 
water table in areas with low or zero recharge.  Groundwater pumping between 
1950 and 1990 depleted significant portions of the High Plains aquifer, causing 
water table declines, especially in southwest Kansas.  As a result of these 
declines, the Kansas Department of Agriculture, Division of Water Resources 
(DWR), has officially closed many areas of western and central Kansas to new 
groundwater development.
Groundwater pumping has led to the second problem, a decrease of 
instream baseflow and a reduction in riparian vegetation.  Overpumping has 
dried up or threatened numerous reaches of baseflow-dependent streams,53
wetlands, and subirrigated land (land irrigated naturally with a high water 
table) in Kansas along the fringes of the High Plains aquifer.  As a result of 
these groundwater level declines, streamflows of western and central Kansas 
have been decreasing, especially since the mid-1970s.  Riparian vegetation has 
suffered the worst of these declines in western and central Kansas, with 
numerous dead cottonwood and poplar trees visible across the countryside.54  
The third problem in Kansas concerns the shrinkage of streamflows in 
watersheds that are hydrologically connected to groundwater supplies.  In 
response to these streamflow declines, the Kansas Legislature passed a series 
of minimum desirable streamflow (MDS) statutes in 1984, which attempt to 
maintain streamflows across Kansas.55  Although these statutes were an 
important step toward conservation of surface water supplies and riparian 
habitat within the state, they have not succeeded in reducing the decades-long 
trend of declining outflows from streambeds down to the baseflow.  This 
problem continues because the MDS statutes obey the law of prior 
appropriation: although water rights issued subsequent to the MDS statutes are 
subject to their requirements, water rights existing before the MDS take 
priority over MDS, and are thus unaffected by the MDS limits.56  Maps 
52. John C. Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas: A Brief History and Assessment, 
15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 460 (2006).
53. “Baseflow” is the term used to describe the movement of alluvial groundwater. 
54. M.A. Sophocleous, From Safe Yield to Sustainable Development of Water Resources: 
The Kansas Experience, 235 J. HYDROLOGY 27, 38 (2000).
55. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-703a, -703b (1997).
56. § 82a-703b. 
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comparing the perennial streams in Kansas in the 1960s to those of the 1990s 
show a marked decrease in miles of streamflow in the western third of the 
state.57
The fourth problem consists of increases in soil and water salinity, which 
have resulted from groundwater irrigation.  Increases in groundwater use leave 
behind salts in the soil, which dissolve in irrigated flows.  Saline water from 
irrigation return flows in the Upper Arkansas River basin now threaten the 
groundwater resources of the alluvial and Ogallala aquifers in Kansas.58  The 
Kansas Geological Survey has embarked on a multi-year study to analyze the 
impact of Arkansas River salinity on these aquifers, salinity that results from 
irrigation return flows in both Colorado and Kansas. 
IV. WATER LAW AND WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE YELLOW RIVER 
BASIN AND IN KANSAS
A.  China
China’s water management system is part and parcel of China’s 
centralized political system.  While every provincial government may have its 
specified water law and management policies, each must obey the principles of 
national water law and policy. 
Before 2002, China exercised a system of unified administration of water 
resources, in association with several departments at each level of 
government.59  Under the new Water Law of 2002, the Ministry of Water 
Resources (MWR) became responsible for the overall water management of 
China, including surface water and groundwater.  The MWR cooperates with 
the related regional and local departments, based on the concept of integrated 
water resources management.60  For example, while the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP, known as the State Environment Protection 
Administration before 2007) oversees water pollution control including water 
quality monitoring, the MWR is also responsible for monitoring water 
quality.61
At the regional level and local levels, China has adopted a combination of 
water management systems.  The first regional management system is based on 
57. Sophocleous, supra note 54, at 29.
58. D.O. Whittemore et al., The Upper Arkansas River Corridor Study: An Update, 
HYDROGRAM, Spring 1999, at 17.
59. Water Law (promulgated by the Order No. 61 of the President of the Nat’l People’s 
Cong. on Jan. 21, 1988, effective July 1, 1988), art. 9 [hereinafter 1988 Water Law].
60. Water Law (promulgated by Order No. 74 of the President of the Nat’l People’s Cong. 
on Aug. 29, 2002, effective Oct. 1, 2002) arts. 2, 12 & 13, available at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207454.htm [hereinafter 2002 Water Law].
61. Id., art. 81; Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 11, 1984, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., May 15, 1996, and amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 
28, 2008, effective June 1, 2008), available at http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008/03/water-pollution-prevention-and-control-law.pdf.
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the river basin’s hydrology, while the second is based on the political-
administrative units of China’s government. The MWR established basin 
commissions for each of the seven major river basins in China, to conduct 
basin-wide water management, mainly of large, trans-provincial rivers or lakes 
on behalf of the MWR.62  At the local level, the departments of water resources 
at the provincial, prefecture (city), and county levels of government are 
responsible for overall water management under their corresponding 
administrative jurisdictions and under the cooperation of the same level 
government departments.63  
Chinese water management is undergoing transition and reform in an 
effort to coordinate surface and groundwater management as well as urban and 
rural water management.  Ultimately, this reform seeks to integrate all water-
related administrative responsibilities into one unique water agency, in charge 
of unified surface water and groundwater management both in rural and urban 
regions, in order to improve the capacity to enhance integrated water resources 
management.  Such a bureau has been established in Shenzhen City, a special 
economic zone.  The need for such a bureau is demonstrated by the sheer 
number of local governments in China, where there are 1,359 local 
governments at the provincial (e.g. Beijing, Shanghai, Henan, Shanxi), 
prefectural ( e.g. Xi’an, Baotou, Zhengzhou), and county levels. To coordinate 
and integrate such a multiplicity of water administration, Chinese authorities 
have been working to merge all water administration-related water 
responsibilities into a unique water administration department.64  At the same 
time, the China Geological Survey (CGS), under the Ministry of Land and 
Natural Resources (MLNR), formerly the Ministry of Geology and Mineral 
Sources (MGMR), is still playing an important role in groundwater monitoring 
and technical management.  The CGS advises MWR on the groundwater 
planning and groundwater permit management, although it no longer issues 
groundwater permits on behalf of MWR.65  However, there is a large 
discrepancy among estimates of available groundwater in the Basin. In 1998, 
experts from the MLNR estimated those supplies to be 44.665 billion cubic 
meters (BCM), or 36.2 million acre-feet, while the MGMR estimated them to 
be 45.178 BCM (36.6 million acre-feet), and the YRCC estimated them to be 
40.5 BCM (32.8 million acre-feet).66  
B. Kansas 
In the United States, administrative agencies involved with water issues 
exist at all levels of government: federal agencies, state agencies, interstate 
62. 2002 Water Law, supra note 60, art. 12.
63. Id. at arts. 12-13.
64. See Weigui Liang et al., The Challenges and Countermeasures in the Unified Water 
Affairs Administration, 10 J. WATER ARENA 12, 12-14 (2006) (P.R.C.).
65. Regulation on Administration of Water Permit and Water Resource Fees (2006), art. 7 
(on file with author Xue Yunpeng) [hereinafter Regulation of Water Permits].
66. XUEYU ET AL., supra note 32, at 148-49.
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water commissions, special water districts, and municipalities.  These agencies 
have reasonably well-defined responsibilities and jurisdictions, although the 
responsibilities occasionally overlap.  At the national level, the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of 
Interior are responsible for management of federal dams in the east and the 
west, respectively.67  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 
responsible for water pollution matters. 
In the state of Kansas, DWR is responsible for water quantity—water 
allocation and water rights management.  Along with EPA, the Kansas 
Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) is responsible for water 
quality, enforcing state water quality standards, environmental laws relating to 
water, and other regulations.  The Kansas Water Office (KWO) formulates a 
state water plan, and contracts with local water users for water supply from 
federal reservoirs.68  The Kansas Water Authority (“KWA”), which consists of 
representatives from water user groups, heads of the water-related departments 
of Kansas, and water experts appointed by the governor of Kansas, also 
formulates state water plans.69  The KWA meets periodically to discuss and 
approve long-term water planning concepts and the annual Kansas Water Plan 
drafted by the KWO.  The Water Plan is then submitted to the legislature for 
consideration and possible approval and implementation.
To further enhance institutional coordination and efficiency, former 
Governor Kathleen Sebelius formed a sub-cabinet team consisting of her 
energy advisor, Joe Harkins, and the heads of six water-related agencies—the 
Department of Agriculture (KDA), Department of Wildlife and Parks (DWP), 
KDHE, the State Conservation Commission (SCC), DWR, and the KWO.  The 
team meets two to three hours every week, to discuss and to implement 
sophisticated techniques and holistic approaches to agriculture, energy, water 
development, and environmental protection.  The sub-cabinet team attempts to 
cooperate in applying a coherent approach to dealing with complicated 
relationships involving water, such as competing policy demands for water 
supplies among different agencies. 
In response to the groundwater depletion problem, Kansas established 
five Groundwater Management Districts (“GMDs”) in central and western 
Kansas in the 1970s.  The purpose of the GMD Act, passed in 1972, was “to 
establish the right of local water users to determine their destiny with respect to 
the use of groundwater insofar as it does not conflict with the basic law and 
policies of the state of Kansas.”70  The staff and the boards of Kansas GMDs 
assist the Chief Engineer in developing and administering groundwater policy 
within the boundaries of each GMD.  Those policies vary with the GMD: 
67. This is a generalization: the Corps and the Bureau cooperate in managing the water 
supplies of federal reservoirs. The Bureau of Reclamation acts as the federal contracting agent for 
irrigation water supplies stored in Corps reservoirs.
68. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-2608 (2002).
69. § 74-2622 (Supp 2008).
70. § 82a-1020 (1997).
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GMD2 and GMD5, whose groundwater supplies are rechargeable, have 
policies of zero depletion of groundwater, while GMD3, which overlays the 
fossil water of the Ogallala, has a policy of planned depletion.71
The Chief Engineer of DWR also has the power to establish Intensive 
Groundwater Use Control Areas (IGUCAs).72  To establish an IGUCA, the 
Chief Engineer must find that the hydrological conditions require it: that 
groundwater levels are declining or have declined excessively; or that the rate 
of groundwater withdrawals exceeds the rate of recharge; or that preventable 
waste of water is taking place; or that water quality is deteriorating; or that 
other conditions exist that require regulation in the public interest.73  Although 
a main purpose of the GMD Act is to foster cooperation between the local 
GMD board and the Chief Engineer, the Act endows the Chief Engineer with 
clear statutory power to impose an IGUCA by his own initiative.74  As part of 
that power, the statute empowers the Chief Engineer to reduce the annual 
pumping of water rights holders, regardless of the priority date of a particular 
water right.75  
However, the Chief Engineer’s statutory power to reduce such water 
rights in an IGUCA raises potential legal conflicts between individual property 
rights and the powers of the state.  The constitutionality of this power has been 
questioned.76 Under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, property 
rights are protected against “takings” by the government without 
compensation.  Water rights are defined as real property rights.77  Thus, the 
forced reduction of annual pumping of senior water rights by the Chief 
Engineer is arguably a “taking.”  This issue has not been resolved, however, by 
the Kansas Supreme Court.  In other states, a slow evolution and 
transformation of the fundamental concept of how water rights are viewed is 
underway.  States are empowered to cut back on pumping if “waste” is 
occurring.78  In California, the Public Trust Doctrine has been employed to 
empower the state agency to reduce surface water rights;79 in North Dakota, it 
has been employed to prevent the issuance of new groundwater appropriations 
and to impose water planning in groundwater.80  
71. Kan. Admin. Regs. § 5-23-4 (2003).
72. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1036 (1997), 82a-1038 (Supp. 2008).
73. § 82a-1036(a)-(e). 
74. Kan. Atty. Gen. Ops. 2002-24, 2007-32.
75. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1038(b) (Supp. 2008).
76. See John C. Peck, Property Rights in Groundwater—Some Lessons from Kansas 
Experience, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493 (2003); Kan. Atty. Gen. Op. 1988-6 (considering 
whether the chief engineer’s reduction of a groundwater right amounts to a compensable taking 
under the Fifth Amendment depends upon the purpose of the taking).
77. § 82a-701(g) (Supp. 2008).
78. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1990).
79. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (1983).
80. For North Dakota, see United Plainsmen Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Conservation 
Comm’n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (1976).  Idaho is the only other prior appropriation state to voice 
judicial support for the Public Trust Doctrine, albeit only in dicta.  See Idaho Conservation 
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C. Differences in Water Management Principles between the Yellow River 
Basin and Kansas 
In the Basin, the national, basin, and local level water departments 
coordinate both surface water and groundwater management, including water 
planning, water and soil conservation, flood control, water monitoring, water 
allocation, as well as water engineering works construction and management.  
Nonetheless, the national government is the sovereign power among this 
coordination.81  In the United States, the federal government is generally not 
involved directly with groundwater management.  The U.S. Constitution gives 
only limited powers to the federal government, derived mainly from 
constitutional clauses dealing with interstate commerce, federal government 
property, treaty powers, national defense, and health and welfare.  And, 
because private water rights are property rights, they fall under state law 
jurisdiction.  In terms of water-supply infrastructure, the Corps of Engineers 
and the Bureau of Reclamation construct, maintain, and operate large 
reservoirs, but state governments generally act as the mediator between federal 
supply and local water use.82
In China, trans-boundary water disputes between different administrative 
areas are resolved through negotiation among the relevant agencies.  If 
negotiation fails, the dispute then becomes subject to arbitration or mediation 
by a higher government agency with jurisdiction over both agencies.83  
Administrative orders are enforced by administrative punishments such as 
warnings, demerits, gross demerits, demotions, dismissals, and expulsions of 
leaders who disobey orders or commit fault.84  As a practical fact, however, 
neither the YRCC nor even the MWR has enough effective administrative 
power or economic leverage to prevent the provinces from using more water 
than their allocated quotas.  Only the State Council has the power to punish the
provincial governor and other high officials, and this power is seldom 
exercised. Although the Yellow River Water Regulation Act of 2006 provides 
punishments for the provincial leader who fails to conduct unified water 
allocation, the Act contains no such provision for sanctions against the 
lawbreaker province or compensation to the harmed provinces.85  Thus, there is 
League, Inc. v. State (Idaho 1995); Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985).  However, these 
decisions led the Idaho legislature to repudiate the doctrine and any possible application of it to 
the appropriation of water, use of water, or anything related to water rights in Idaho.  IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (1996). 
81. 2002 Water Law, supra note 60, arts. 2, 12, 13, 17, 42, 44, & 46.
82. This is a principal role of the Kansas Water Office.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-2608, 74-
2609 (2008).
83. 2002 Water Law, supra note 60, art. 56.
84. The Civil Servant Law (promulgated by Order No. 35 by the President of the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., April 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 55-56, available at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/tcslotproc462/. 
85. Regulation of Yellow River Water Regulating (promulgated by Decree No. 472 of 
P.R.C. State Council on July 5, 2006, effective Aug. 1, 2006), arts. 4, 36, available at
http://www.yrcc.gov.cn/eng/news/200612/t20061228_11259.htm [hereinafter Yellow River 
Regulation].
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little incentive for provincial officials to limit water use to the prescribed 
allocation.  Although the basin water allocation scheme was issued in 1987, the 
River continued to dry up, and dry-up problems became even worse in the 
1990s.  Even after unified water allocation became the administrative norm in 
1999, water abstraction quotas were still being exceeded in some regions.86
China’s attempt to achieve compliance with its provincial water 
allocations reveals one of the fundamental differences between water 
administration there and in the United States.  Without a legal tradition of 
property rights in water, and a corresponding right to defend those rights, the 
government has chosen personal sanctions against government officials as an 
enforcement mechanism.  Under the Yellow River Water Regulation Act as 
issued by the China State Council, culpable leaders and staff can receive 
administrative sanctions and can even be subject to criminal prosecution if the 
offenses are sufficiently severe.87  Yet because Chinese society lacks a cultural 
tradition of conducting administrative management based strictly on following 
the law, the Act’s efficacy remains in question. 
The western United States has its share of trans-boundary water disputes.  
Most of these involve disputes over rivers that flow through more than one 
state, such as the Arkansas River.  Three methods exist to resolve such 
disputes.  The first method is a decree of the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
allocates the water supply of an interstate stream based on the principle of 
equitable apportionment.88  A second allocation method is Congressional 
allocation, which has occurred for the Colorado River and perhaps for the 
Missouri River.89  The third method is the interstate compact, a contract 
between states to allocate interstate waters, which is then approved by 
Congress.  Because of the interstate nature of a compact, the United States 
Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction in resolving interstate disputes 
over water, whether an interstate compact exists or not.90
Groundwater management has become a central issue in recent interstate 
water litigation.  One reason for this is that most interstate water compacts 
86. See YRCC, YELLOW RIVER WATER RESOURCES, supra note 31, at 46-49.
87. Yellow River Regulation, supra note 85, art. 36.
88. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 
(1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 
(1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
89. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).  One may ask whether the Flood Control 
Act of 1944, 33 U.S.C. § 701-1(b), may arguably have represented a Congressional allocation of 
the Missouri River.  See GEORGE GOULD, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 506 
n.5 (7th ed. 2005) (“Congressional apportionment of the Missouri River?” The Act adopted the 
Pick-Sloan Plan that authorized the system of reservoirs ultimately constructed in several states in 
the basin.  In addition, the O’Mahoney-Milliton Amendment granted priority to irrigation 
interests on federal reservoirs west of the 98th Principal Meridian, while granting priority to 
navigation interests east of that line.).
90. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 1-2; Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  See 
also Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77-78 (1992) (“[T]he description of our jurisdiction as 
‘exclusive’ [in 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)] necessarily denies jurisdiction of such cases to any other 
federal court.”).
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were enacted before pumping of groundwater for irrigation on the High Plains 
was first recognized as a serious problem.  Kansas v. Colorado involved a 
series of disputes over Colorado’s groundwater pumping in the Arkansas River 
Basin. Kansas sued Colorado in 1985, and after a lengthy trial before Special 
Master Arthur L. Littleworth, the Court in 1995 adopted his recommendation 
that Colorado had violated the Compact by extensive post-Compact 
groundwater pumping.91  After nearly twenty years of litigation, Kansas 
obtained relief in 2004, when the Supreme Court ordered Colorado to pay $34 
million in compensation to Kansas, and to reduce groundwater pumping that 
was depleting surface flows of the Arkansas River.  In 1998, Kansas filed a 
similar suit against Nebraska to enforce its rights under the Republican River 
Compact.92  In that case, the Court’s Special Master ruled that groundwater 
that contributed to Republican River flows was indeed part of the “virgin water 
supply” of the Compact.93 The states then settled the case.94  Nebraska, 
however, immediately fell out of compliance with the settlement, largely 
because it does not regulate groundwater withdrawals in conjunction with 
surface water flows.95  Kansas has resumed legal action to enforce both the 
settlement and the Republican River Compact. 
At least four lessons can be learned from these Kansas cases.  The first 
lesson is purely legal: the Supreme Court has held that alluvial groundwater 
and groundwater baseflow are included in interstate water compacts that do not 
mention groundwater.96  The second lesson is political.  State political 
leaders—governors, attorneys general, and directors of natural resources—are 
often tempted to disobey their compact obligations to other states, rather than 
face the political consequence of making the unpopular decision to reduce their 
constituents’ water use.  The third lesson is both legal and political.  An 
interstate water allocation compact limits a State’s water use to that established 
in the compact, regardless of the amount of water rights the state had granted 
on the river in question prior to the Compact.97  Yet where a state does not 
administer surface water rights and groundwater rights in one legally 
integrated system of prior appropriation, the political power of groundwater 
91. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995). See also Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86 
(2004), and John C. Peck, Groundwater Management in the High Plans Aquifer in the USA: 
Legal Problems and Innovations, in THE AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL GROUNDWATER 
REVOLUTION (Mark Giordano & K.G. Villhoth eds., 2007).
92. Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, 522 U.S. 1073 (1998).
93. Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, 538 U.S. 720 (2003); Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, 
540 U.S. 964 (2003) (approving Special Master’s Final Report certifying adoption of the RRCA 
groundwater model).
94. Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, 540 U.S. at n. 91 (2002) (stating the final settlement 
stipulation). 
95. See, e.g., Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005).
96. See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska & Colorado, No. 126 Orig., Final Settlement Stipulation, 
Vol. 5, App. J, RRCA Groundwater Model Materials (Dec. 15, 2002); Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 
105 Orig., Fifth and Final Report of the Special Master, Vol. III, App. C, Hydrological-
Institutional Model Documentation and Usable Flow Methodology (Jan. 2008).
97. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
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interests can frustrate that state’s ability to comply with a compact.98  
Legislative efforts in Nebraska to obtain compact compliance by imposing a 
local property tax to fund water purchases have recently been found 
unconstitutional.99
The final lesson, one of the oldest chestnuts in western water law, is 
geographical: it is better to be upstream with a shovel than downstream with a 
decree.  Upstream states have a natural advantage with interstate compacts.  
Because water allocated to a downstream state flows through the lands of an 
upstream state, that upstream state can choose to comply or to breach.  If the 
upstream state chooses to breach, it becomes the burden of the downstream 
state to file suit and prove noncompliance.100  The downstream state has no 
choice between compliance and breach; its only recourse is through the 
compact and its dispute resolution procedures; and even if it prevails in 
interstate litigation, the upstream state remains upstream, a natural advantage.  
Substantial political will is required of the downstream state to file a suit that 
has such uncertain costs, duration, and prospects of a positive outcome.
D. Water Allocation Systems in the Yellow River Basin and Kansas
1.  China
In China the water resources are owned by the nation, except the water 
stored in the ponds of collective units in rural regions, which is owned by the 
units.  The central China State Council holds the water resources rights on 
behalf of the nation.101  However, the State encourages units and individuals to 
develop and to use water resources in accordance with law, and the State 
98. In Nebraska, surface water is governed by one set of laws that are administered 
centrally by the state’s Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”).  NEB. REV. STAT. § 61-206 
(2008).  However, groundwater is governed by a different set of laws administered by local 
Natural Resource Districts (“NRDs”).  § 46-702.  An NRD is a political subdivision of the state of 
Nebraska.  § 2-3213.  Each NRD has its own taxing authority.  Its board members are popularly 
elected, and its authority is limited to its discrete geographical area.  See generally § 2-3201 et 
seq.  In fully appropriated areas, the NRDs regulate groundwater use by adopting Integrated 
Management Plans (“IMPs”) with the concurrence of the DNR.  § 46-715(1).  Because the NRDs 
“jointly develop” the IMP with the DNR, the NRDs have effective veto control over what limits 
become effective in the IMP.  Id.  Thus, the state of Nebraska, acting through the DNR, has no 
supervisory authority over the NRDs concerning groundwater administration.  The DNR can 
obtain such authority but only with the review and concurrence of the Interrelated Water Review 
Board, a five-person committee appointed by the governor.  See § 46-719(2)(a).  To date, the 
DNR has not sought such authority.
99. Garey v. Neb. Dep’t of Natural Res., 759 N.W.2d 919 (Neb. 2009) (finding localized 
property tax levied for state purpose of compliance with Republican River Compact in violation 
of Art. VIII, § 1A of the Nebraska Constitution).
100. In the absence of an interstate compact, when a downstream state is suing for equitable 
apportionment, the upstream state may defend the action by showing that it obtains a benefit that 
outweighs the detriment suffered by the under-supplied, downstream state.  Kansas v. Colorado, 
206 U.S. 46, 113-14, 117 (1907); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 619, 622 (1945); 
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 (1982); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 
(1984).
101. 2002 Water Law, supra note 60, art. 3.
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protects their legitimate rights and interests.102  The State implements systems 
of water permitting and the paid use of water resources, with the exception that 
rural collective economic organizations and their members use the water in 
their own ponds and reservoirs.  The department of water administration under 
the State Council administers water-withdrawal licenses and the paid use of 
water resources throughout the country. 
China introduced a water permit system in 1993,103 and in 2006 the China 
State Council issued regulations on water permits and water resources fee 
collection.104  To keep in step with economic reform, the government has 
established basic principles of water rights and the water permit system, which 
are still undergoing change and improvement. 
Due to the different relationship between property and water rights in 
China, water allocation and permitting systems in China differ significantly 
from that of prior appropriation states such as Kansas.  Water rights in China 
are not property rights held by any institution or individual, but are rather 
licenses, granted by the government in the form of “water abstraction 
permits.”105  Every water abstraction permit is a temporary permit with a set 
time limit, normally of five years, and never over ten years, and these permits 
automatically expire after the date stipulated on the permit.  But the permit can 
be renewed under a standard process.106  
Water use priority in China depends on the type of water use.  Domestic 
water use has the highest preference, but the order among agricultural, 
industrial, environmental, and navigation use is not clearly declared under 
Chinese water law.  However, a preference order for a designated water body 
can be determined by the provincial government as necessary.107  In the Basin, 
domestic water use and basic water use for the environment (including 
sediment flushing and minimum streamflow) have high priority.  The Yellow 
River Water Regulation Act states that “[w]hile the domestic water use in rural 
and urban areas is the highest priority of water supply, Yellow River water 
regulating shall also balance the water demand of agriculture, industry and 
environment so as to prevent the Yellow River from discontinuous flowing.”108  
In the Basin, the Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC) and the 
provincial and local Department of Water Resources (PDWR) jointly manage 
102. Id. arts. 6-7.
103. See Rules of Implementing the Water Withdrawal Permit System (promulgated by 
Decree No. 119 of the People’s Republic of China State Council on August 1, 1993), 
http://www.chinawater.net.cn/law/W03.htm (last visited April 15, 2009).
104. See Regulation on the Administration of the License for Water Drawing and the Levy 
of Water Resource Fees (promulgated by Decree No. 460 of the People’s Republic of China State 
Council on February 21, 2006), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-03/06/content_220023.htm (last 
visited April 15, 2009) [hereinafter Regulation for Water Drawing]. 
105. See 2002 Water Law, supra note 60, arts. 4, 7.
106. Regulation on Water Drawing, supra note 104, art. 25. 
107. Regulation of Water Permits, supra note 65, art. 5.
108. Yellow River Water Regulation Act (2006), arts. 3, 8 (on file with author Xue 
Yunpeng).
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water permitting.109  The YRCC issues permits to the largest water users, those 
whose water abstraction amounts exceed certain limits established by the 
MWR.  For example, the YRCC examines and issues the water permit of a 
water user whose surface intake capacity for agricultural use exceeds 15 m3/s 
in the main stem and 8 m3/s in the tributary Wei River, and for groundwater if 
the user’s groundwater abstraction capacity exceeds 20,000 m3 per day.110  
Under these withdrawal limits, the PDWR issues water permits within its 
province or autonomous region. 
Groundwater abstraction permits in urban regions can be issued only by 
the YRCC or the PDWR with prior agreement of the Departments of Urban 
Construction of the local governments.111  Before 2006, the China Geological 
Survey and Department of Construction had the responsibilities of issuing 
groundwater permits under the 1993 water permit regulation of China.112  
Under the water abstraction limit and within its time period, a water 
permit or part of a permit may be sold or leased, provided the original permit 
issuing organization approves the transfer.  This may be done as long as the 
original water volume to be transferred is maintained by the adoption if 
necessary of water saving measures by the transferee.113  However, this kind of 
practice was not allowed and was subjected to punishment in the water permit 
regulation of 1993.114
Water management in the Basin controls total water abstraction, and 
imposes quota-based water use management principles.  The safe yield concept 
is used to evaluate groundwater use permit applications.115  In 1987, the State 
Council adopted the Yellow River Consumable Water Allocation Scheme, a 
“total volume control” principle for surface water permit evaluation.  Under 
the Scheme, a water quota for each of the eleven provinces (both autonomous 
regions and municipalities) along the river was allocated based on the annual 
average surface water runoff of the River, with water volume reserved for 
sediment flushing and environmental flows.116  
2.  Kansas
With the passage of the Kansas Water Appropriation Act (“KWAA”)117 in 
1945, Kansas adopted the prior appropriation doctrine.  Under the KWAA, all 
109. See Regulation of Water Permits, supra note 65, art. 14.
110. See Ministry of Water Resources of China (MWR), Notice on the administrative 
responsibility of YRCC in the Yellow River water abstraction permit management, in Water 
Policy and Resources 197 (1994).
111. See Regulation of Water Permits, supra note 65, art. 19.
112. Rules on Implementing the Water Withdrawal Permit System (1993), art. 17 (on file 
with author Xue Yunpeng).
113. Regulation of Water Permits, supra note 65, art. 27. 
114. Rules of Implementing the Water Withdrawal Permit System (1993), arts. 26, 28, 30 
(on file with author Xue Yunpeng).
115. Regulation of Water Permits, supra note 65, arts. 7, 15, 16, 20.
116. YRCC, YELLOW RIVER WATER RESOURCES, supra note 31, at 57.
117. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 et seq. (1997 & Supp. 2008).
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surface and groundwater within the state is dedicated to the use of Kansans, 
but is subject to the control of the Chief Engineer, in accordance with the 
principles of prior appropriation.118  The Chief Engineer controls and regulates 
that water chiefly through the issuance of permits to appropriate water, permits 
that become water rights through the process known as perfection, as described 
below.  
As prior appropriation rights, Kansas water rights are governed by the 
basic principles of priority and appropriation.  Regarding priority, “the first in 
time is the first in right.”119  The Chief Engineer can grant a new water permit
only if that right does not impair the existing water rights from the water 
supply, and if there is sufficient water supply to grant the right.120  It is illegal 
for any person, including a junior water right owner, to prevent water from 
moving to a person with a senior water right.121  If the water use of a junior 
water right owner impairs that of a senior water right owner, then DWR has the 
statutory duty to enforce the KWAA “in accordance with the rights of priority 
of appropriation.”122  Water rights in Kansas are usufructuary rights. Generally 
speaking, the owner of a water right must put the water under that right to 
beneficial use in order to keep the right, unless there is due and sufficient cause 
for non-use of the water.123
Kansas water rights are real property rights,124 and so receive protection 
from uncompensated takings by the government, under the Fifth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution.125  Except for temporary and term permits, water 
rights are held in perpetuity, as long as the holders meet the conditions 
associated with them.  A water right application ripens into a property interest 
with the first diversion and use of water after approval of the application, but 
the applicant still must complete a “perfection period” of typically five years 
for agricultural use and twenty years for municipal use.  The perfection period 
gives the permit holder time to establish diversion works and pump or divert 
water, and it gives DWR a chance to inspect the diversion works to insure that 
the permit holder is meeting the conditions associated with the permit.  After 
the perfection period runs, DWR “certifies” the permit, and the owner files the 
certificate in the register of deeds in the county where the point of diversion is 
located. Kansas also has a preference list in the Water Appropriation Act, 
ordering water uses as follows: domestic, municipal, irrigation, industrial, 





123. §§ 82a-718(a), (b)(3) (Supp. 2008).  The Kansas Supreme Court has stated that this 
statute is a forfeiture statute (arguably in dicta).  Hawley v. Kan. Dep’t of Agric., 132 P.3d 870, 
880, 884, 888 (Kan. 2006) (dictum).  See also John C. Peck & Constance Crittenden Owen, Loss 
of Kansas Water Rights for Non-Use, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 801, 823-25 (1995). 
124. § 82a-701(g) (Supp. 2008).
125. See James H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental Interference with the Use of 
Water: When Do Unconstitutional “Takings” Occur?, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 6, 7 (2005) 
(citations omitted).
@BCL@A8059DC2.DOC   (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/2009  7:50 AM
2009] GRIGGS, PECK, YUNPENG:  COMPARATIVE WATER LAW 451
recreational, and water power.126  But it is not clear what this preference list 
means, since priority in time governs.127
The concept of safe yield was first used as a guideline to control the total 
permitted withdrawal of groundwater in the two central Kansas GMDs—the 
Equus Beds GMD No. 2, and the Big Bend GMD No. 5.128  DWR employs the 
concept of safe yield in other parts of Kansas, but in some regions it is too late 
for safe yield, due to the problem of over-appropriation, and so overpumping 
remains.  This is the dominant problem in Western Kansas GMD No. 1, 
Southwest Kansas GMD No. 3, and Northwest Kansas GMD No. 4, where the 
principal source of groundwater is the Ogallala Aquifer, which is effectively 
not rechargeable.  Overappropriation has forced these GMD’s to close much of 
their areas to new appropriations,129 and to place extra restrictions on the 
granting of new appropriations.  GMD3 has a nominal policy of “safe yield,” 
but that policy is in truth one of planned depletion, allowing permits if they do 
not create more than a 40% loss of the aquifer within a two-mile radius circle 
over twenty-five years.130
3.  Comments on the Different Water Allocation Systems 
If the principles of total volume control for surface water and of 
sustainable yield for groundwater are adopted and strictly reinforced by a 
government at the beginning of a water-permitting regime, subsequent 
problems of over-drafting can be avoided.  Unfortunately, this has not been the 
case in either the Basin or in Kansas.
A short-term water permit system in China gives the water-managing 
administration great flexibility and power to adjust water allocation policy in 
the changing natural and social-economic environment.  However, a licensing 
system does put institutions and individuals at risk of losing water permits and 
associated investments without reasonable compensation from the government. 
A progressive water management approach has evolved in Kansas.  These 
include  water-management programs, minimum-stream-flow standards, 
required water use reporting and water metering, the use of modified safe-yield 
policies in some GMDs, integrated resource planning and development by the 
City of Wichita, and a subbasin water-resources-management program by 
DWR, as well as other programs.  These are all appropriate steps on the road to 
sustainable development.131  The prior appropriation system is a good tool for 
protecting the water rights of senior holders, and it can reduce depletion, if the 
126. § 82a-707(b).
127. § 82a-707(c).
128. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-22-7, -25-4 (2009) (regarding safe yield and sustainable 
yield, respectively).
129. See, e.g., § 5-23-4b (closing certain townships in GMD No. 3 to new appropriations).
130. §§ 5-23-4, -23-4a(b).
131. KANSAS GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF 
WATER RESOURCES IN KANSAS 239 (Marios Sophocleous ed., 1998), available at 
http://www.kgs.ku.edu/publications/books/1998/sophocleous.
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administrator has the technical knowledge to know the sustainable yield of a 
water system and the authority to stop issuing new permits.  However, in 
western Kansas, too many water rights were granted before state officials 
realized that depletion was taking place and was causing serious problems.  
Water users with junior water rights, even for important uses, are thus not 
protected in the long run, unless the Chief Engineer can create a management 
program that imposes across-the-board reductions in water rights, as in an 
IGUCA.  Given the identity of Kansas water rights as real property rights, if 
the government were serious about imposing sustainable yield now, it would 
have to pay a high cost to purchase and retire, or otherwise reduce water rights.  
Indeed, as Leland A. Rolfs, former counsel to Kansas DWR has written, 
temporary water rights would make it easier for DWR to make wise decisions 
on how to allocate water use.132
E. Water Right Transfers as a Management Tool
1. Water Right Transfer Experiments in the Yellow River Basin
Like the United States, the western region of China is rich in natural 
mineral resources and is a center for the mineral industry; it is also less 
populated and developed compared to the eastern region, due to its harsh 
climate and landscape.  Under the national government’s “National Grand Plan 
of Developing West,” the regions along the Yellow River of NXAR and IMAR 
will be developed as centers of coal-burning electricity and the production of 
coal-based chemicals.  However, since the two regions have exceeded their 
corresponding water quotas (due mostly to very low irrigation efficiencies), a 
serious and deteriorating water shortage problem has developed in the Basin.  
In response, the YRCC suspended issuing new water abstraction permits to the 
NXAR and the IMAR in 2002, which closes the door to any new industrial 
enterprises’ obtaining new water permits there.133  Inspired by the successful 
water market approaches in Australia and the USA, and with the support of 
MWR the YRCC and the governments of the NXAR and the IMAR, some 
industrial enterprises reached an agreement in 2003 to conduct water rights 
transfer experiments.134  
Water transfers in the Basin encourage industrial enterprises to invest in 
irrigation water-saving projects, according to the irrigation district’s approved 
water saving plan.  Such a plan is intended to save water that would have been 
lost in the canal water transportation process and on farmland in low-efficient 
irrigation systems.  Part of the saved water will contribute to reducing the total 
water use of the NXAR and the IMAR, and prevent these two regions from 
exceeding their corresponding water quotas.  The remainder of the saved water 
can then be transferred for industrial development.  
132. Leland A. Rolfs, Comparing and Contrasting the Roles of the Division of Water 
Resources and the Groundwater Management Districts in Groundwater Management and 
Regulation, 15 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 505, 515-16 (2006).
133. YRCC, DESIGN & PRACTICE, supra note 37, at 32.
134. Id. at 31.
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In the water right transfer process, the point of diversion for the industrial 
enterprise need not be in the same location as the water-saving engineering 
project of the farmer.135  To ensure that the amount of water in the field used 
for crops will not be less than the amount used before the water transfer 
project, the farmers will be compensated in dry years, since, according to the 
China Technical Code on Irrigation and Drainage Engineering Works Design 
(GB 50288-99), the designed water supply security rate of industry is protected 
to 95% to 97% of its needs, while that of irrigation is only 50% to 75%.  
Likewise, water losses to the ecosystem, which would otherwise benefit from 
recharge and return flows, need to be addressed.136  
The water transfer experiment is a government-conducted process.  The 
YRCC first requested the governments of the NXAR and the IMAR to carry 
out feasibility studies and to establish the Yellow River water right transfer 
plan at the provincial level.  Provincial governments are responsible both for 
managing the funds provided by interested industrial enterprises and for 
ensuring the quality of water saving projects.  Furthermore, governments 
determine the price of the transferred water, based on the cost estimates 
formulated by the MWR.  Chinese water right transfers are not based on a free 
market, and the irrigation district will not profit from the transfer process; 
indeed, its revenue may shrink, since its farmers will use less water after the 
transfer.  For example, the revenue of the South Bank Irrigation District fell by 
1.1 million RMB between 2005 and 2006, due to the construction of water-
saving engineering works and the water transfers that followed.137  
At this early, experimental stage of the water transfer program, the main 
water saving project is the lining of irrigation canals.  Based on the life spans 
of conservation works and industrial equipment in the region, the term of any 
water transfer is twenty-five years.138  Under the present water permit 
management system, it is the irrigation management institution that holds the 
water abstraction permit of the irrigation district, and the irrigating farmers 
who belong to that irrigation district have no corresponding individual water 
permits.139  Thus, the entities in the water transfer cases are the irrigation 
district management institution and the industrial enterprise.  As there is no 
clear water right for end users in an irrigation district, it is impossible for the 
end water user or the possible corporation of the end users to exchange its 
water rights in the market.
135. This is different from changes in Kansas.  There, a point of diversion may be changed, 
but the new point of diversion must take water from the same water source.  DWR has interpreted 
this to mean that while points of diversion from a river may move up and down the river long 
distances as long as no other rights are impaired by the move, wells pumping groundwater cannot 
be moved more than one-half mile, or about 800 meters.
136. YRCC, DESIGN & PRACTICE, supra note 37, at 110-11.
137. Id. at 194.
138. Id. at 104-05.
139. By contrast, members of an irrigation district in prior appropriation states in the U.S. 
hold shares in that district, and so have a vested property interest in the water rights held by the 
district.  See, e.g., In re Water Rights of Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 147 P.3d 9 (2006).
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Because the use of water right transfers is the only way for enterprises in 
the NXAR and the IMAR to obtain water abstraction permits from the YRCC, 
there is a large demand from the coal-based electric and chemical industries for 
water permits obtained from water right transfers.  Until 2008, there were 
nineteen industrial enterprises that had been approved or would be approved to 
obtain water permits by investing in water right transfer projects.  Overall, 
these approvals will create an estimated savings of 220 million m3 per year, 
196 million m3 of which can be transferred for industrial use.140  
By the end of 2006, the YRCC had approved five water right transfer 
experimental projects in the NXAR and the IMAR.  The water saving 
engineering works of the first experimental project have been finished, and 
they passed inspection in November 2006.  A total of 42 km of irrigation 
canals have been lined, which is expected to save 21.73 million m3 of water 
per year, from which an 18.8 million m3 water use right (which is part of the 
water use permit of the irrigation district) was transferred to a coal-burning 
electric plant investing in the water saving works.141
In China, temporary water permits are allowed for five years, but transfers 
are allowed for twenty-five years.  Thus, there is a discrepancy regarding the 
validity of the period of a water right transfer.  Further amendment and a clear 
legal procedure are needed to address this issue.  Also, the policy of the 
irrigation end user not having a water right should be improved to increase the 
marketability of individual allocations, and to prevent possible loss of rights 
and profits of the end users.
The water right transfer policy in the YRB has helped to solve some water 
problems for industrial enterprises, and it has also created a new investment 
channel for irrigation water savings.  However, the irrigation districts that hold 
the water permits have not profited by these transfers.  Worse, they may lose 
profits by supplying water to the farmers, who use less water due to the 
improvements in canal system efficiency, thereby reducing the districts’ water 
fees.  A policy modification might be considered to protect the interests of the 
irrigation districts.  Water markets in the YRB could be liberalized to allow 
any interested entity to invest in the irrigation water saving projects and obtain 
profits from selling the saved water.  Similarly, incentive policies to encourage 
groundwater use efficiency would help to reduce salinity problems. Further 
studies might also include the effects on farmers and irrigation district 
management institutions, as well as on the environment.
2.  Kansas 
As a result of groundwater and streamflow declines, DWR has officially 
closed many areas of western and central Kansas to new groundwater 
development.  In this region, the only way to obtain a water right is by 
140. YRCC, DESIGN & PRACTICE, supra note 37, at 110-11.
141. See generally Journal of Energy Saving and Environment Protection, available at
http://www.cnki.net.
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purchasing an existing water right.  Since a Kansas water right is a real 
property right, it can be sold together with the land to which it is appurtenant, 
or the water right may be sold separately.142
If the purchaser of a water right wants to change the use made of water, 
the point of diversion, or the place of use, the owner must receive prior 
approval of the Chief Engineer.143  If it is determined that an application for 
change complies with all applicable statutes, rules, and regulations, and if 
approval would neither impair the use of water under an existing water right 
nor unreasonably affect the public interest, the Chief Engineer will approve the 
application for change and issue an order approving the change.  Should an 
order be issued, the Chief Engineer may require the owners to comply with 
additional conditions and limitations.  DWR has established an online water 
right database to make it easier for anyone who is interested in learning about 
detailed water right information.144
A recent trend in Kansas is the transfer of water rights from agricultural to 
industrial and municipal use.  However, such transfers constitute one of the 
most important and contentious areas of western water law.145  Although the 
Kansas irrigator who sells his water right to an industry or city may profit from 
the sale, these water transfers, without investment in agricultural water 
conservation, will affect agricultural productivity. 
Besides the technical factors, the “public interest” is also an important 
element for DWR in deciding whether to approve or deny the water right 
change application.  Over the last three years, Kansas politics has been 
dominated by Sunflower Electric Corporation’s proposed three new 700 
megawatt coal-fired electric generating plants, which it had hoped to build near 
Holcomb, Kansas.146  
These proposed plants would require water rights to provide cooling 
water, and those water rights will have to be obtained by transfers.  
Approximately 29,000 acre feet (35.8 million m3) of water from the Ogallala 
142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(g) (Supp. 2008).
143. § 82a-708b (Supp. 2008).
144. See Kansas Geological Survey & Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, Division of Water 
Resources, Water Information Management and Analysis System, 
http://hercules.kgs.ku.edu/geohydro/wimas/index.cfm (last visited May 11, 2009). 
145. See, e.g., Sandra Zellmer, Anti-Speculation & Water Law: Ghost-Busting, Trust-
Busting, or Ensuring Beneficial Use?, 50 WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL.  April 15, 
2008, at 15-16 (discussing, among others, “uber-entrepreneur” T. Boone Pickens’s plan to 
transfer water from the Texas panhandle to Texas cities); Ruth Heide, Mighty Miss may solve 
western water woes, ALAMOSA VALLEY COURIER, Feb. 11, 2009, available at
http://www.alamosanews.com/V2_news_articles.php?heading=0&page=72&story_id=11609 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2009) (summarizing the proposal of Gary Hauser, a Gunnison hay farmer, to 
establish a “Central Plains Compact” among Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, and Missouri, to build 
a 1,200 mile, $22.5 billion pipeline between the Mississippi River at Hickman, Kentucky and 
Monument Hill, Colorado, with laterals to the other states).
146. See generally Robert Glicksman, Coal-Fired Power Plants, Greenhouse Gases, and 
State Statutory Substantial Endangerment Provisions: Climate Change Comes to Kansas 56 KAN.
L.R. 517 (2008).
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aquifer would be needed for the new coal-fired power plants.  Consequently, 
Sunflower has obtained purchase options on 29,000 acres of sand hill land and 
nearly 48,000 acre feet (59.2 million m3) of agriculture water rights from 
irrigating farmers.  DWR regulations require that when irrigation water is 
acquired for a new use such as industrial or municipal use, the size of the water 
right must be reduced to account for changes in consumptive use; in this case, 
the optioned water rights will be reduced by approximately 40%.147  These 
three new coal plants, combined with the existing coal plant operated by 
Sunflower, would use 8 billion gallons (30.28 million m3) of water a year from 
the Ogallala aquifer.  The Ogallala aquifer is already depleted in some areas, 
and according to opponents of the new plants such as the Sierra Club, other 
parts of the aquifer will be depleted within the next sixty years or less.148  
Due to the uncertainty of whether the plants will be built, DWR has yet to 
process and approve the water rights transfers.  However, KDHE held several 
hearings on issuing air pollution control permits.  In October 2007, KDHE 
denied the air-quality permits necessary for these plants, provoking a fight in 
the Kansas legislature which continued through the 2009 Kansas legislative 
session.  People who live hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away have 
joined the hot debate over the plants.  In May 2009, Governor Mark Parkinson 
succeeded Governor Kathleen Sebelius, who joined President Obama’s 
cabinet.  Shortly after being sworn in, Governor Parkinson announced a 
compromise that would permit the construction of a single 895 megawatt coal-
fired power plant at Holcomb.  KDHE’s administrative decision to deny 
Sunflower an air permit, the lobbying efforts on either side of the controversy 
in the Kansas legislature, the role of the controversy in state elections, and the 
governor’s announced compromise all reveal the interactive and complex 
influences of water and environmental issues in the politics of Kansas.
F. Innovative measures to improve water management
1.  The Basin: Unified Water Regulation to Ensure Minimum 
Streamflow  
In the Yellow River Water Allocation Scheme approved by State Council 
of 1987, of the total of 58 billion m3 of annual average natural runoff, a total of 
21 billion m3 is reserved for sediment flushing and streamflows.  Only 37 
billion m3 is allowed for consumption for agricultural, industrial, and domestic 
water use by the nine riparian provinces and autonomous regions of the Basin, 
as well as Tianjin City and Hebei Province in the Haihe River Basin.149  
The total water volume control principle is the guideline for issuing water 
abstraction permits.  The provincial government’s total of the permitted water 
147. Press Release, Wheatland Electric, Holcomb Expansion (June 16, 2006), available at
http://www.weci.net/news/HLC_Expansion_NewsVol_1_Issue_8_5x11.pdf.
148. Press Release, Kansas Sierra Club,  Kansas Sierra Club Calls for Coal Plant 
Moratorium (Sept. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.kansas.sierraclub.org/Wind/Coal%20Moratorium.htm. 
149. See YRCC, YELLOW RIVER WATER RESOURCES, supra note 31, at 68-69.
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abstraction volume is not allowed to exceed its share of the quota.  Principles 
of unified water allocation, pro rata adjustment, and multi-year reservoir 
regulation have been applied since 1999.  The actual water abstraction volume 
of each permit is proportionally adjusted each year and month subject to the 
actual water supply.  A comprehensive water regulation decision support 
system was established, which includes streamflow and water quality based on 
a real-time monitoring system: a drought monitoring system, a water allocation 
and dam regulation simulation system, and an irrigation gate remote control 
system.  Besides regular annual, monthly, and ten-day base water regulation 
plans, the YRCC even conducts daily regulation for the purpose of 
dynamically controlling water abstractions in each province and at important 
water abstraction sites during critical drought periods.  
To prevent the river from drying up, in 2003 the YRCC set up an alarm 
and emergency response management mechanism for alerting district 
managers of the minimum streamflow discharge values of the provincial 
boundary hydrological stations and some other important stations.150  The 
emergency response management mechanism was further improved in 2008.151
The YRCC can reduce or even stop water abstractions if the discharge of any 
index station falls below the minimum streamflow threshold.  Although the 
main stem has not fallen to zero discharge since the unified water regulation 
was established in 1999, the river is still essentially dried up because the low 
river flow is too small to sustain its environmental function.152  In 2005, the 
YRCC initiated an ambitious integrated river basin water resources 
management program called “Keep the Healthy Life of the Yellow River.”  
This program seeks to adopt holistic approaches to deal with flood, water 
shortage, soil erosion, and water pollution issues, to control water demand 
economically, to provide sustainable water resources for social and economic 
development of the basin, and to keep the river ecosystem healthy.153
One of the approaches of the program is to carry out more strict and 
accurate unified water regulations.  Nine important tributaries of the Yellow 
River have been selected as the initial tributaries for intensive water resources 
management, and two trans-provincial tributaries, the Wei River and the Qin 
River, have been selected to exercise unified water allocation and regulation 
experiments since November 1, 2006.154  The remote monitoring and control 
system of the lower reach at the present irrigation gates will be expanded to 
cover all the important irrigation gates in the upper and middle reaches.  The 
present water allocation and regulation system for the main stem of the Yellow 
River will be updated to a more sophisticated basin-wide water allocation and 
150. See http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/19/20030528/1002259.html.
151. See http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-09/19/content_1100282.htm.
152. See Ni Jinren & Qian Zhenghan, Discussion on the Functional Dry Up of the Yellow 
River, 32 SCIENCE IN CHINA (SERIES E) 496, 496-502 (2002) (P.R.C.).
153. See Li Guoying, Keep the River Healthy: A Case Study of the Yellow River, 11 J.
YELLOW RIVER 1, 1-5 (2005) (P.R.C.).
154. Xindai, supra note 30, at 16-19.
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regulation system.155
2. Kansas
Besides controls on new development, regulation of existing 
development, and well-spacing requirements, Kansas has adopted several new 
approaches to improve water management and to solve the problem of 
declining groundwater levels.  These management programs require, among 
other things, annual water use reporting and water metering on all new non-
domestic wells and on all wells in specially-designated areas.  Currently, 
Kansas law requires all water right holders to report their water use 
information annually to the Chief Engineer.156  Deliberate falsification of data 
on a report is a class C misdemeanor, and late reporting is subject to authorized 
fines. Each year, DWR mails out approximately 14,650 water use report forms 
to water right holders in Kansas. Of these, approximately 93% are returned to 
the Chief Engineer before the deadline, which has drastically improved the 
state water use database, yielding valuable information.  
Kansas has developed many programs to retire water rights.  These 
include the Water Transition Assistance Program (WTAP, or WaterTap) and 
the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP).  Under these 
programs, Kansas can buy back water rights from irrigators in the target 
project areas, and then permanently retire the water rights, to extend the useful 
life of the High Plains aquifer or to mitigate the spread of saline water into 
aquifer and stream-aquifer systems.157
The City of Wichita has also developed an innovative Aquifer Storage 
and Recovery (“ASR”) program.  The ASR program involves capturing excess 
flows from the Little Arkansas River when available, and then recharging that 
water into the Equus Beds Aquifer, just north of Wichita, to be recovered in 
times of drought.  The plan established a priority of water use, whereby 
Wichita would first use its surface water rights from rivers that would normally 
flow through the area, saving the slowly replenished groundwater resources for 
times when the first-priority water is not available.158  A series of systems 
monitor groundwater levels and quality.  
DWR’s decisions regarding water rights are rooted in rigorous scientific 
research and technical analysis, and depend upon advanced water, land, 
weather, and socio-economic monitoring and analysis systems under the 
cooperation of government agencies, universities, and research institutions of 
155. Su Maolin, Study on the Accurate Regulation of Water Resources of the Yellow River, 
1 J.  YELLOW RIVER 1, 1-2 (2007) (P.R.C.).
156. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-732 (2004).
157. See Kansas Water Office, Online HydroGram (August 2007), 
http://www.kwo.org/kwo%20hydrogram/Article_WTAP_Aug2007.pdf; Conservation Reserve 
Enhancement Program, http://www.kwo.org/KWA/WPPI/Project_1.pdf  (last visited April 13, 
2009).
158. See Equus Beds Ground-Water Recharge Demonstration Project, 
http://ks.water.usgs.gov/studies/equus/ (last visited April 13, 2009).
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the U.S.  For example, water quantity and quality data and many research 
reports are available on the United States Geological Survey website 
(www.usgs.com), and computer-based groundwater models are run in DWR 
and the Kansas GMDs to evaluate water supply.159  Groundwater modeling has 
become particularly important in interstate water litigation and the GMDs.  In 
both Kansas v. Colorado and Kansas v. Nebraska, the U.S. Supreme Court 
approved groundwater models that the states and the federal government 
cooperated in producing, and that set allocations and evaluate compliance 
under the respective compacts and settlements.160
V.  CONCLUSIONS
Water shortage and water allocation are serious problems in western 
China and the western United States, where agriculture is almost impossible 
without irrigation, and where energy development requires increasingly large 
amounts of water to be transferred from agriculture use.  The Basin and Kansas 
are in different stages of development and have different social systems.  
Comparing water law and management in these disparate areas can provide for 
a more informed reconsideration of their water policies.  Some preliminary 
observations and conclusions are as follows: 
Both the Basin and Kansas face serious problems of streamflow declines 
and the drying up of rivers, mainly due to rapid irrigation development and 
agricultural water consumption.  In the Basin, irrigation efficiency is very low 
because traditional and cheap irrigation methods dominate.  The low efficiency 
irrigation system has resulted in an over-abstraction of surface water, and has 
caused salinity problems in large irrigation districts, especially the irrigation 
districts of the NXAR and the IMAR in the northwest part of the Basin.  At the 
same time, water users are causing serious groundwater depletion and a 
continuous decline of the water table in the Basin.  In Kansas, irrigation 
efficiency is relatively high due to the wide-spread use of center pivot 
irrigation systems.  But these systems have overexploited the groundwater, 
causing water table declines, particularly in southwest Kansas.  
Current surface water diversions from the Yellow River, combined with 
present groundwater diversions, remain much less than the estimated 
renewable groundwater storage in the region.  If groundwater supplies had 
been properly developed before the surface irrigation projects, it is likely that 
neither the NXAR nor the IMAR would have overused their surface quotas, 
overuse which took water that should have been used by downstream users and 
159. See Kansas Water Office, Online HydroGram (August 2007), 
http://www.kwo.org/kwo%20hydrogram/Article_WTAP_Aug2007.pdf; Conservation Reserve 
Enhancement Program, http://www.kwo.org/KWA/WPPI/Project_1.pdf  (last visited April 13, 
2009).
160. Kansas v. Colorado, No. 105 Orig., Fifth and Final Report of the Special Master, vol. 
III, App. C.1, Hydrological-Institutional Model Documentation (Jan. 2008); Kansas v. Nebraska 
& Colorado, No. 126 Orig., Final Report of the Special Master with Certificate of Adoption of 
RRCA Groundwater Model (Sept. 17, 2003). 
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remained in the River.  Moreover, reduced surface diversions would have 
significantly reduced the surface irrigation water-induced salinity 
problems.Since the cost of groundwater irrigation (both tube well construction 
costs and electricity costs to operate the pumps) is higher than that of surface 
water irrigation,161 less than thirty percent of the tube wells are actually 
used.162 An incentive policy for proper groundwater development could be 
considered.  Due to the large discrepancy among estimates of available 
groundwater in the Basin, further coordination and cooperation among the 
many different government departments might be considered to improve water 
management in China.  Also, due to this discrepancy there is still need for 
further coordination and cooperation among the many different government 
departments. 
Since 1945, Kansas has employed a rather complete legislative and
institutional system to deal with the water resources management problems, 
and the system is still evolving and improving.  By contrast, the water law 
system in the Basin has lagged behind.  Both the institutional setting and water 
laws are still in a developing stage that corresponds with ongoing policy 
changes and economic reforms in China.  To avoid conflicts in sector policies 
and overlaps in responsibilities, and to achieve coordination in water, food, and 
energy policy, China and the Basin might consider establishing organizations 
similar to those in Kansas: the Kansas Water Authority, the Kansas Water 
Office, and the cabinet-level water group responsible to the governor for 
establishing a holistic and coordinated basin-centered water development plan
and policies to handle water crises.  A special assistant to the governor helps 
bridge water, food, and energy issues.  In addition, broad stakeholder 
participation in decision making and a public hearing process should also be 
adopted in water rights transfers, water permit evaluations, and inspection 
processes to avoid possible side impacts to third parties. 
Like the Kansas water permit system, the system in the Basin is used to 
allocate surface water and groundwater.  However, unlike Kansas, every Basin 
permit is a short-term permit that has to be renewed normally every five years 
with the priority decided by water use type instead of priority date.  The short-
term water permit system in China gives the water administration the 
flexibility and power to adjust water allocation policy in the changing natural 
and socio-economic environment.  This flexibility makes it easier for the 
government agency to adjust its water management to protect the overall 
public benefit and the environment.  However, the system also leaves the risk 
that institutions and individuals may lose their water permits and associated 
interests without reasonable compensation from the government.  China might 
161. Wu Yong, Ningxia is Short of Water Even Though the Yellow River is Nearby, 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 5, 2003, http://news.xinhuanet.com/focus/2003-
09/05/content_1065632_1.htm.  It is roughly estimated that the comprehensive irrigation water 
fee of surface water and groundwater is 1.5 cents and 9 cents RMB per cubic meter, the cost of 
groundwater irrigation is about 5 times higher than the surface water in NXAR.  Id.
162. THE HYDROLOGY BUREAU OF NINGXIA (HBNX), THE YELLOW RIVER WATER RIGHT 
TRANSFER MASTER PLAN OF THE NINGXIA AUTONOMOUS REGION (2005) (P.R.C.).
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consider changes to correct the inconsistency between the short-term period of 
the water permit and the long term allowed in water rights transfer projects.  
Likewise, Kansas might consider changing its permanent water right system to 
a quasi-permanent one, in order to adapt to changing social and economic 
conditions.  The difficulty in Kansas on this front, however, is that the U.S. 
Constitution protects property rights from being taken, indeed perhaps 
significantly even changed, without compensation. Kansas could begin, 
however, by limiting the terms of new permits and not making them perpetual.
In China, it was not until the new water permit management regulation of 
China was issued in 2006 that water use rights were first allowed to be 
transferred.  To encourage water savings and improve water use efficiency, 
only water saved through adopting water saving approaches under a water 
permit may be transferred for profit.  In Kansas, water rights are property 
rights that can be bought and sold in the market. China might consider 
allowing more liberal water rights transfers to enable more water to flow to 
more highly efficient and productive users.  However, just purchasing water 
rights from the market without a required and accompanying investment in 
agricultural water savings in Kansas invariably affects agricultural 
productivity, although the individual farmer who sells water may derive more 
profit from the sale.  China would necessarily have to bear its food security 
issue in mind in studying whether this kind of water right transfer approach is 
suitable. 
In the Basin, the combination of a water permit system for water 
allocation and the unified water regulation system for daily water abstraction 
monitoring and management has proven to be a successful approach to ensure 
that water is fairly and equally used among different provinces, while also 
assuring that the minimum environmental flow demand is met.  However, 
under Kansas’s prior appropriation water right system, the MDS cannot always 
be ensured.  Thus, the only way to ensue MDS is to buy senior water rights. 
The IWMI-Kansas Program held in Kansas in 2006 was successful in 
bringing water professionals together from different countries to learn from 
each other.  The provincial and state governments in China, the U.S., and other 
countries should continue to collaborate with and aid IWMI by facilitating, 
establishing, supporting, sponsoring, and helping fund similar programs for the 
study of comparative water law and policy.  Future programs could broaden 
the scope of participation by including other types of scientists, economists, 
lawyers, law professors, and other state and governmental officials.
